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Security in WAMF v0.4.3

v0.4.3 fixes embedded-navigation URL handling and carries forward v0.4.2 security fixes while retaining documented compatibility and deployment risks. It is not a vulnerability-free release. This page summarizes the release-specific records; it does not certify every deployed image or native environment.

Security Fixes

  • Embedded navigation (v0.4.3): link destinations are parsed using the browser URL API and restricted to HTTP/HTTPS. Unsafe or malformed destinations are removed. Internal links, fragments, external HTTP/HTTPS links and Home Assistant embed=ha navigation are preserved. See the tagged implementation.

The following fixes were introduced in v0.4.2 and remain in v0.4.3:

  • Detection rendering and event identifiers (F-001): detection values are treated as DOM/text data rather than executable HTML or inline handlers. Frigate event identifiers are validated before ingestion, media requests, publication and archiving.
  • Login throttling (F-004): spoofable forwarding headers no longer determine the client identity. Concurrent attempts and overflow state retain their limits. Clients behind one proxy or NAT share a bucket; see Authentication.
  • Requests and diagnostics: media-proxy paths, redirects, cleanup and forwarded headers are hardened; internal login destinations and bounded Wikipedia redirects are validated. Corrected responses/logs avoid YAML source excerpts, credential-bearing exceptions and unescaped control characters.

Browser Assets

F-005: Monaco Editor 0.52.2 and its workers are served locally with the original MIT licence, third-party notices and checksum/provenance manifest.

Bootstrap and jQuery remain external CDN assets. Their tags use SHA-384 Subresource Integrity and anonymous CORS. Integrity checks verify expected content; they neither provide CDN availability nor establish that the selected library versions are vulnerability-free. Do not assume the entire interface works offline.

See the asset integrity record.

Retained Protobuf Risk

The release retains protobuf 3.20.3 and the documented deferral for CVE-2025-4565 and CVE-2026-0994. TFLite Support 0.4.4 requires protobuf below 4, so an isolated major protobuf upgrade is not included.

The published v0.4.3 release records these alerts as dismissed for accepted risk, not patched. The trusted bundled-model boundary does not remove these vulnerabilities. See the compatibility decision and limitations.

Local Packaging Tools (F-006)

The release records a scoped risk acceptance for local pip/setuptools exposure, finalized on 27 October 2026. No execution path through normal WAMF operation was identified, but affected tools remain relevant during package downloads, installation and distribution-building operations.

Keep packaging tools reviewed and current, avoid untrusted indexes and artifacts, and plan tooling maintenance before processing untrusted inputs. The acceptance is not a claim that retained tools are safe for arbitrary packages.

The Docker build checks dependencies and removes packaging tools and ensurepip from the merged runtime filesystem. That mitigation depends on their actual absence; it does not certify older or independently built images, erase inherited layers, or constitute a new v0.4.2 image scan.

See the F-006 assessment.

The setup link is a credential. Anyone who obtains the unused link and can reach WAMF within its lifetime can set the administrator password. Expiry and single use limit exposure but do not remove retained log copies.

The conditional acceptance finalized on 27 October 2026 requires operators to:

  • Restrict startup logs, console recordings and exported copies to trusted administrators authorized to perform setup.
  • Protect access to centralized log collectors, dashboards and exports.
  • Disable setup request-body capture in proxies, tracing systems and WAFs: the POST body contains the token and chosen password.
  • Use HTTPS or a trusted tunnel for remote setup.
  • Complete setup promptly and keep the unused link private.

The printed loopback URL does not restrict access to localhost. Network exposure depends on the listening address, published ports, proxies and firewall rules. Where log access and the other conditions cannot be adequately controlled, this risk acceptance does not apply.

See Authentication for setup instructions and the F-007 assessment for the full conditions.

Docker and Other Retained Limitations

The v0.4.1 Docker hardening is carried forward: a reviewed base digest, build-time Debian updates, constrained dependencies, dependency checking and removal of unused multimedia components and packaging tools.

The container still runs as root and retains the existing Flask runtime and supported legacy credential compatibility. Debian/native-library limitations also remain. Configuration saves require a writable directory mount and use mode-0600 atomic replacement; see Docker.

Historical image findings and measurements belong to their recorded builds. Source-test success and a working deployment do not establish that the published image has no vulnerabilities. The v0.4.3 release records a successful AMD64 build and isolated smoke test, which did not exercise live Frigate/MQTT. The successful publishing workflow included a CRITICAL-only Trivy gate with ignore-unfixed: true; it does not establish absence of lower-severity or unfixed vulnerabilities. The isolated smoke test did not establish a separate comprehensive image-security scan. Historical v0.4.2 preparation conditions remain historical records, not the current v0.4.3 publication status.

Release and Upgrade Records